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Abstract
The goal of causal inference is to understand the
outcome of alternative courses of action. How-
ever, all causal inference requires assumptions.
Such assumptions can be more influential than in
typical tasks for probabilistic modeling, and test-
ing those assumptions is important to assess the
validity of causal inference. We develop model
criticism for Bayesian causal inference, build-
ing on the idea of posterior predictive checks
to assess model fit. Our approach involves de-
composing the problem, separately criticizing the
model of treatment assignments and the model
of outcomes. Conditioned on the assumption of
unconfoundedness—that the treatments are as-
signed independently of the potential outcomes—
we show how to check any additional modeling
assumption. Our approach provides a foundation
for diagnosing model-based causal inferences.
1 Introduction
Consider the problem of understanding the “treatment ef-
fect” of an intervention, such as giving a drug to patients
with a specific disease. In the language of Neyman (1923);
Rubin (1974), each individual has a potential outcomewhen
given the drug and a potential outcome when not given the
drug. One measurement of the causal effect is the average
difference (over individuals) between those potential out-
comes. In the language of graphical models, this is framed
as evaluating the impact of an intervention on random vari-
ables in a probabilistic graph (Pearl, 2000). The funda-
mental problem of causal inference is that we do not ob-
serve both potential outcomes for any individual at the same
time (Holland, 1986); to estimate the causal effect, we need
assumptions about the data generating process.
Assumptions are important to all probabilistic modeling,
but especially for making causal inferences. In such infer-
ences, we make strong assumptions about how treatments
are assigned to individuals and each individual’s distribu-
tion of potential outcomes. Given assumptions about the
data, there are myriad methods for model-based causal in-
ference (Pearl, 2000; Robins et al., 2000; Morgan and Win-
ship, 2014; Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
We focus on Bayesian methods. Bayesian methods have
a long history in causal inference (Rubin, 1974; Rauden-
bush and Bryk, 1986). In recent years, applied researchers
are increasingly able to fit complicated probabilistic mod-
els to capture fine-grained phenomena—for example, high-
dimensional regressions with regularization to handle large
numbers of predictors (Maathuis et al., 2009; Belloni et al.,
2014), or hierarchical models to adjust for unmeasured co-
variates and capture heterogeneity in treatment effects (Hi-
rano et al., 2000; Feller and Gelman, 2014).
However, for applied researchers, Bayesian methods can
been difficult to use. One reason for this is the lack of
diagnostic tools to check such complicated models. For
high-dimensional and massive data, prior information—
beliefs that capture our assumptions on the data generating
process—can be essential in order to draw efficient causal
inferences (Bottou et al., 2013; Peters et al., 2015; Johans-
son et al., 2016). This in turn necessitates ways to check the
modeling assumptions.
We develop model criticism for Bayesian causal infer-
ence. We build on the idea of posterior predictive checks
(ppcs) (Box, 1980; Rubin, 1984; Gelman et al., 1996) to
adapt goodness-of-fit style calculations to causal modeling.
We decompose the problem, separately criticizing the two
components that make up a causal model: the model of
treatment assignments and the model of outcomes.
We emphasize that there are several causal assumptions
that our method cannot check. First, we do not check
unconfoundedness. There are many existing methods for
this, such as robustness tests (Angrist, 2004; Lu and White,
2014; Chen and Pearl, 2015) and estimation of pseudo
causal effects (Rosenbaum et al., 1987; Heckman and Hotz,
1989). The results of these methods do not directly test
unconfoundedness—such tests are theoretically not possi-
ble (Pearl, 2000)—but can lend plausibility to the assump-
tion. Second, we do not check correlation between poten-
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tial outcomes. This is also untestable as no pair of potential
outcomes is observed for a single data point. In practice, we
recommend using existing methods to understand the plau-
sibility of these untestable assumptions, and then to apply
our methods to check the additional assumptions.
In Section 2, we describe model-based causal inference
with potential outcomes. In Section 3, we develop meth-
ods for checking the models and confirm their properties
on simulated data. In Section 4, we show how the methods
can be applied for real-world problems: an observational
study on the effect of pest management in urban apartments
and an educational experiment on the effect of television
exposure on children.
1.1 Related Work
There has been little work on Bayesian model criticism
for causal inference. Model checking is a frequent activ-
ity in the practice of propensity score analysis, typically for
matching (Dehejia, 2005; Austin, 2009). Standard econo-
metric texts (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010) discuss re-
gression diagnostics and specification error. Neither of
them considers a Bayesian treatment of diagnostics or how
to check Bayesian methods for causal inference.
Our method borrows from the rich literature on doubly ro-
bust estimation (Robins and Rotnitzky, 2001; Van der Laan
and Robins, 2003; Bang and Robins, 2005) and inverse
probability of treatment weighting (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983; Heckman et al., 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
Suchmethods are designed tomitigate selection bias, which
arises from phenomena such as uncontrolled nonresponse
and attrition, for the estimation of causal effects. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we consider how such techniques can be applied
for diagnosing model misfit.
Central to ppcs is the idea of predictive assessment: amodel
is evaluated by its predictions on future data given past in-
formation (Dawid, 1984). This has come up in the con-
text of causal inference via targeted learning and the super
learner (Van der Laan and Rubin, 2006; Van der Laan et al.,
2007). In fact, targeted learning can be thought of as max-
imizing the statistical power for a given ppc (which we de-
scribe in Section 3).
In the context of missing data analysis, imputation of miss-
ing data has been a de facto standard for model checking
(see, e.g., Chaloner (1991); Gelman et al. (2005); Su et al.
(2011)). This approach can also be applied for checking
causal models. In Section 4, we discuss it in detail and com-
pare it to our approach.
2 Causal models
We describe causal models in terms of the potential out-
comes framework (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974; Imbens
and Rubin, 2015). Let y(0),y(1) be the set of potential out-
comes under a binary treatment a ∈ {0, 1}; and let yi(a) be
the outcome when an individual i is exposed to treatment a.
We use uppercase, e.g.,Y(0),Y(1), to denote random vari-
ables and lowercase, e.g., y(0),y(1), to denote their real-
izations. (See Appendix for a table of our notation.)
2.1 Definition of a causal model
Let xi denote a set of covariates for an individual i. The
potential outcomes arise from an outcome model,
θ ∼ p(θ)
xi ∼ p(x) (1)
(yi(0), yi(1)) ∼ p(y(0), y(1) | θ, xi).
The potential outcomes are exchangeable across individu-
als; they are conditionally independent given the outcome
parameters θ and covariates xi.
Unfortunately we do not observe both potential outcomes
for any individual. The outcome we observe is determined
by the assignment model of the treatment indicators ai. The
treatment indicator ai equals one if we observe yi(1) and
equals zero if we observe yi(0).
We consider the unconfounded assignment model. Each as-
signment is drawn conditional on the covariates xi and un-
known assignment parameters φ,
φ ∼ p(φ)
ai ∼ p(a |xi, φ).
(2)
This model assumes unconfoundedness: (Y (0), Y (1)) ⊥
A |X . In other words, conditional on the covariates, the
potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assign-
ment. In missing data analysis, the assumption is known as
strong ignorability (Little and Rubin, 1987).
We combine the outcome and assignment model in a causal
model. With an unconfounded assignment model, the
causal model is
p(θ, φ,x,y(0),y(1),a) = (3)
p(θ)p(φ)p(x)p(y(0),y(1) | θ,x)p(a |φ,x).
We observe x, a, and y(a); all the other variables are la-
tent.
For exposition, we make a few simplifications. Specifically,
we assume: (1) the outcomes of an individual are indepen-
dent of the assignment of other individuals; (2) the outcome
and assignment model parameters are independent; and (3)
the treatment assignment has binary support. The approach
we describe extends beyond these settings.
2.2 Bayesian inference in a causal model
Given observed data {x,a,y(a)}, we would like to calcu-
late the posterior distribution of the assignment parameters
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φ and outcome parameters θ. Let a¯ denote the unobserved
counterfactual assignments, i.e., a¯ = 1−a. Wemarginalize
out the counterfactuals to calculate the posterior,
p(θ, φ |y(a),a,x) ∝ p(θ)p(φ)p(a |φ,x)
×
∫
p(y(a),y(a¯) | θ,x) dy(a¯). (4)
Because of unconfoundedness, the posterior factorizes,
p(θ |y(a),a,x) ∝ p(θ)
∫
p(y(a),y(a¯) | θ,x) dy(a¯),
p(φ |y(a),a,x) ∝ p(φ)p(a |φ,x).
In other words, the assignment mechanism plays no role
when inferring potential outcomes. Similarly, the potential
outcomes play no role when inferring the assignment mech-
anism. Motivated by this consequence of ignorability (Ru-
bin, 1976; Dawid and Dickey, 1977), we devise a method
that separately checks the fitted parameters θ and φ.
3 Model criticism for causal inference
Model criticism measures the degree to which a model
falsely describes the data (Gelman and Shalizi, 2012). We
can never validate whether a model is true—no model will
be true in practice—but we can try to uncover where the
model goes wrong. Model criticism helps justify the model
as an approximation or point to good directions for revising
the model.
The central tool of model criticism is the posterior predic-
tive check (ppc). It quantifies the degree to which data gen-
erated from the model deviate from the observed data (Box,
1980; Rubin, 1984; Gelman et al., 1996).
The procedure is:
1. Design a discrepancy function, a statistic of the data and
hidden variables. A “targeted” discrepancy summarizes
a specific component of the data, such as a quantile.
An “omnibus” discrepancy is an overall summary of the
data, such as the χ2 goodness of fit.
2. Form the realized discrepancy. It is the discrepancy
evaluated at the observed data along with posterior sam-
ples of the hidden variables.
3. Form the reference distribution. It the distribution of the
discrepancy applied to data sets from the posterior pre-
dictive distribution. In contrast to the realized discrep-
ancy where the observations are fixed, the reference dis-
tribution is evaluated on samples of both observations
and hidden variables.
4. Finally, locate the realized discrepancy in the reference
distribution, e.g., by making a plot or by calculating a
tail probability. If the realized discrepancy is unlikely,
then the model poorly describes this function of the data
and we revise the model. If it is reasonable, then this
provides evidence that the model is justified.
ppcs are typically applied to validating non-causal mod-
els, especially for exploratory and unsupervised tasks (Yano
et al., 2001; Royle and Dorazio, 2008; Mimno and Blei,
2011; Mimno et al., 2015). Here we extend this method-
ology to validating causal models.
3.1 Posterior predictive checks for causal
models
We first consider the discrepancy function. Define a causal
discrepancy to be a scalar function of the form,
T ((y(0),y(1)),a, θ, φ). (5)
It is a function of all variables in the causal model of Eq.4:
the potential outcomes y(0),y(1), the treatment assign-
ment a, the outcome model parameters θ, and the assign-
ment model parameters φ. Depending on the check, it is a
function of a subset of these variables.
In the original formulation of a ppc, the discrepancy was a
function solely of observed data (Rubin, 1984). Later work
extended the discrepancy to also depend on latent parame-
ters (Meng, 1994; Gelman et al., 1996). The causal discrep-
ancy of Eq.5 depends on observed outcomes and assign-
ments, latent parameters, and unobserved outcomes, i.e.,
the counterfactual outcomes. Discrepancies of this form
were studied in the context of missing data by Gelman et al.
(2005).
We will use causal discrepancies to check each piece of the
causal model. To complete the definition of a causal check,
we must define the reference distribution and the realized
discrepancy. In a ppc the reference distribution is the pos-
terior predictive. This is the distribution that the data would
have come from if the model were true.
Let y(0)rep,y(1)rep,arep denote replicated data from the
posterior predictive distribution. Define the observed
datasetDobs = {x,y(a),a}. We replicate the assignments
and outcomes conditioned on Dobs,
φrep ∼ p(φ | Dobs)
arep ∼ p(a |x, φrep)
θrep ∼ p(θ | Dobs)
y(0)rep,y(1)rep ∼ p(y(0),y(1) |x, θrep).
(6)
This defines the reference distribution of the causal discrep-
ancy of Eq.5.
A causal check compares the reference discrepancy to the
realized discrepancy. The realized discrepancy is evaluated
on observed data. When T (·) depends on latent variables—
either assignment parameters, outcome parameters, or alter-
native outcomes—we replicate them from the reference dis-
tribution. (In that case the realization of the discrepancy is
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Algorithm 1: Criticism of the assignment model
Input: Assignment model p(φ | Dobs)p(arep |x, φ),
Discrepancy T (a, φ).
Output: Reference distribution p(T ) and
Realized discrepancy T obs.
for s = 1, . . . , S replications do
Draw assignment parameters φs ∼ p(φ | Dobs).
Draw assignments arep,s ∼ p(arep |x, φs).
Calculate discrepancy T rep,s = T (arep,s, φs).
Calculate discrepancy T obs,s = T (a, φs).
end
Form reference distribution p(T ) from replications
{T rep,s}.
Form realized discrepancy T obs from replications
{T obs,s}.
itself a distribution.) Following Gelman et al. (1996, 2005),
the observed data are always held fixed at their observed val-
ues; only latent variables are replicated. This is in contrast
to the reference distribution, which samples all of the vari-
ables. We note that in causal inference, we cannot use this
strategy with the counterfactual outcomes; we will discuss
this nuance below in Section 3.3.
We described the causal discrepancy, its reference distribu-
tion, and its realization. We now show how to use these in-
gredients to criticize causal models. We separate criticism
into two components: criticizing the assignment model and
criticizing the outcome model.
3.2 Criticizing the assignment model
The gold standard for validating causal models is a held-out
experiment, where we have access to the assignment mech-
anism when validating against held-out outcomes (Rubin,
2008). In observational studies, however, the assignment
mechanism is unknown; we must model it with the goal of
capturing the true distribution of the assignments. To check
this aspect of themodel, we apply a standard ppc. Under the
assumption of unconfoundedness, we can check the assign-
ment model with discrepancies T (a, φ) that are functions
of the assignment parameters φ and assignments a.
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure. It isolates the com-
ponents of the model and data relevant to the assignment
mechanism. First we calculate the realized discrepancy
T (a, φrep); then we compare against the reference distribu-
tion T (arep, φrep). The reference distribution is simply the
posterior predictive (Eq.6).1
1The realized discrepancy can also be evaluated on held-out
assignments to avoid criticizing the model with the same observa-
tional data that is used to train it (Bayarri et al., 2007). This is the
approach we use in our study.
Example. Consider the average (marginal) log-likelihood
of assignment,
T (a) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
∫
p(ai |xi, φ)p(φ | Dobs)dφ. (7)
The reference distribution is the log likelihood evaluated
on replications arep. The realized discrepancy is the log
likelihood evaluated on the observed set of assignments a.
Figure 1a show examples of this check. In the third panel
we consider a misspecified assignment model. The log-
likelihood (red) is far from its reference distribution.
3.3 Criticizing the outcome model
The second component of a causal model is the outcome
model,
p(θ)p(y(0),y(1), θ |x). (8)
The outcomemodel represents the causal phenomenon, that
is, the distribution of the outcome y(a) caused by the as-
signment a. The outcome model is inherently difficult to
infer and criticize from data. It involves inferences about a
distribution of counterfactuals, but with data only available
from one counterfactual world.
Outcome discrepancies. We check an outcome model
with an outcome discrepancy, T (y(0),y(1), θ), a function
of the potential outcomes and the parameters that govern
the outcomemodel. One simple example is the average log-
likelihood of the potential outcomes,
1
n
n∑
i=1
(log p(yi(0) | θ, xi) + log p(yi(1) | θ, xi)) (9)
Another example (used, e.g., by Athey and Imbens (2015))
is an adjusted mean squared error of the average treatment
effect,
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
(yi(1)− yi(0)− E [Yi(1)− Yi(0) | θ, xi])2
− (yi(1)− yi(0))2
)
.
(10)
Propensity weighting for the realized discrepancy. Un-
like the assignment checks, the outcome discrepancy is a
function of counterfactual outcomes y(a¯), which we do not
observe. One approach is to use posterior samples of θ to
impute these counterfactuals (Gelman et al., 2005). How-
ever, this is not appropriate when making a causal check.
We discuss this nuance after deriving an alternative ap-
proach.
As an alternative, we use a strategy based on propensity
scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and doubly robust es-
timation (Bang and Robins, 2005). Consider discrepancies
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that are sums of functions of the individual outcomes and
outcome parameter,
T (y(0),y(1), θ) (11)
=
n∑
i=1
(
f0(yi(0), θ) + f
1(yi(1), θ)
)
.
For example, in Eq.9,
f1(yi(1), θ) = log p(yi(1) | θ).
(To minimize notation, we assume that the functions are
identical across data points. They can also depend on
the index i.) For now, we focus on the treatment term
f1(yi(1), θ); the control term is analogous. Consider an
intervention δ1(a) that always assigns a to the treatment,
that is, it places probability one on a = 1 and probability
zero on a = 0. The treatment term can be rewritten as an
expectation under the distribution ai ∼ δ1(a),
f1(y(1), θ) = Eδ1
[
1[Ai = 1]f
1(yi(1), θ)
]
. (12)
Of course, we did not observe ai from this delta distribu-
tion. Sowe approximate the expectationwith an importance
weight,
f1(y(1), θ) ≈ δ1(ai)
pii(ai)
f1(yi(1), θ). (13)
The denominator pii(ai) is the (marginal) probability of the
assignment under the causal model,
pii(ai) =
∫
p(ai |φ)p(φ |a,x)dφ. (14)
Eq.13 only depends on observed data. It equals zero when
the function depends on a counterfactual outcome that we
do not observe, i.e., when ai = 0. It is non-zero when
ai = 1 and we observe yi(1). It is always a valid approxi-
mation but note it assumes that the assignment probability is
correct, i.e., that the assignment model is accurate.
We apply this approximation to each term in Eq.11. This
gives an estimate of the realized discrepancy that only de-
pends on observed data,
T (y(0),y(1), θ) ≈ (15)
n∑
i=1
(
δ1(ai)
pii(ai)
f0i (yi(0), θ) +
δ0(ai)
pii(ai)
f1(yi(1), θ)
)
.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the procedure. This strategy—
replacing each function with its inverse probability
weighted realization—is appropriate beyond sums of func-
tions of the outcomes. It also works for polynomials of
functions and sums of such polynomials. This is the set-
ting of the discrepancy in Eq.10.
Algorithm 2: Criticism of the outcome model
Input: Causal model p(θ | Dobs)p(φ | Dobs)p(y(0),
y(1) |x,θ)p(a |x,φ),
Discrepancy T ((y(0),y(1)),θ).
Output: Reference distribution p(T ) and
Realized discrepancy T obs.
for s = 1, . . . , S replications do
Draw outcome parameters θs ∼ p(θ | Dobs).
Draw outcomes
y(0)rep,s,y(1)rep,s ∼ p(y(0)rep,y(1)rep |x,θs).
Calculate discrepancy
T rep,s = T ((y(0)rep, y(1)rep),θs).
Calculate discrepancy T obs,s using Eq.15.
end
Form reference distribution p(T ) from replications
{T rep,s}.
Form realized discrepancy T obs from replications
{T obs,s}.
Analyzing bias: outcome checks with imputation versus
importance reweighting. We now explain why imputa-
tion is not appropriate when making a causal check. First,
by definition, imputed values are well described by the pos-
terior sample of θ. Thus, checks according to the realized
discrepancy only deviate via the observed data, ignoring the
process by which the values need to be imputed. Second,
all such checks are inherently conditional on a given set of
treatment assignments a. Thus, they may not generalize
well for other treatment assignments.
We now show formally that imputation of missing data re-
sults in biased estimates of the counterfactual terms. Con-
sider a discrepancy as in Eq.11, and focus on a single term,
f(yi(1), θ). Imputation replaces unobserved counterfactu-
als y(a¯i)with randomoutcomes drawn from θ. Denote their
mean µi(a) = E [f(Y (1), θ) | θ, xi].
The difference between the approximation by Gelman et al.
(2005) and the truth is
1[ai = 1]f(yi(1), θ) + 1[ai = 0]µi(1)− f(yi(1), θ).
In other words, the approximation applies f to the observed
yi(1) if ai = 1, and it imputes the value if ai = 0.
Let µ∗i (1) be the true expectation under Y (1). Define bias
to be the expectation of the difference under the true causal
model. After some algebra, it is
(pii(1)− 1)(µ∗i (1)− µi(1)), (16)
where as before, pii(1) is the probability of treatment p(ai =
1).
This bias is non-zero except when µi(1) = µ∗i (1), i.e.,
when the outcome model is correct, or when the assign-
Model Criticism for Bayesian Causal Inference
ment mechanism is deterministic (pii = 1). In the usual
scenario with pii 6= 1, we will incur bias in the coun-
terfactual term. Assuming the outcome model is correct
does not make sense when we are checking the outcome
model.
In contrast, consider the importance-weighted estimate.
The difference between the approximation and the true
value is
1[ai = 1]
pii(1)
f(yi(1), θ)− f(yi(1), θ). (17)
Under the assignment model, this has expectation zero. The
importance weighted estimate is unbiased.
4 Empirical Study
We use both synthetic and real data to illustrate how to val-
idate causal models. With synthetic data we compare our
conclusions to the true data generating mechanism. With
real data we demonstrate our approach to criticize causal
models in practice. In all our studies, we apply the discrep-
ancies from Section 3.2; Section 3.3, i.e., the marginal log-
likelihood of the assignments (Eq.7) and the mean squared
error of the average treatment effect (Eq.10). Note we focus
here on the insights of the criticisms and not the insights of
the causal inferences.
4.1 Synthetic data
We showcase the results of different predictive checks us-
ing data generated from a linear model (detailed below).
We first perform inference under the correct model speci-
fication. Then we introduce misspecifications, either on the
outcome model or the assignment model.
We generate 10, 000 data points, each with a 10-
dimensional covariate xi, a binary treatment ai, and a set
of potential outcomes (yi(0), yi(1)),
xi ∼ Uniform(xi | [0, 1]10),
ai |xi ∼ Bernoulli
(
ai | logistic(x>i φ)
)
,
yi(a) |xi ∼ N
(
yi(a) | [xi, a]>θ, σ2
)
,
We place a standard normal prior over the parameters φ, θ,
and a gamma prior with unit shape and rate on σ2.
We study two scenarios: (i) In the “science-fiction” sce-
nario, we have access simultaneously to yi(0) and yi(1).
(This is not possible in the real world.) (ii) In the “fic-
tion” scenario, we only have access to one counterfactual
outcome, yi = aiyi(1) + (1 − ai)yi(0), and there are
no hidden confounders. In each scenario, we check three
causal models: (a) the correct model as specified above; (b)
a “wrong outcomes” model, where we misspecify the dis-
tribution over yi(a) by ignoring the first entry of xi (i.e.,
θ1 = 0); (c) a “wrong assignment” model, where we mis-
specify the distribution over ai by setting the probability
that ai = 1 to (0.7 + 0.3× logistic(x>i φ)).
We approximate the posterior with Markov chain Monte
Carlo in Stan (Carpenter et al., 2016), obtaining 1000 sam-
ples. In the fiction scenario, we weigh the observations to
form the outcome discrepancy (Section 3). In the science-
fiction scenario, we do not weigh the observations because
we see both y(0) and y(1).
Figure 1a illustrates criticism of the assignment model
(Eq.7) for the science-fiction scenario. (The plots for the
fiction scenario are similar.) As expected, when we use the
correct model the realized discrepancy is approximately in
the center of the reference distribution (panel a); this in-
dicates that the model is correctly specified. We see the
same for the misspecified outcome model (panel b) because
the assignment mechanism is still correct. However, when
the assignment model is wrong, the realized discrepancy
against the reference distribution (panel c) suggests that the
model is misspecified.
We now turn to criticizing the outcome model. Figure 1b;
Figure 2a illustrate the test of the mean squared error of
the average treatment effect (ate) (Eq.10) for the science-
fiction and fiction scenarios, respectively. As expected, the
test for the correct model does not suggest any issue (panel
a). When the outcome model is wrong, the test fails (panel
b). This correctly indicates that we should revise the model.
In the science-fiction scenario, the misspecification on the
assignment model does not affect the outcomemodel (panel
c), and thus the test indicates correctness.
In the fiction scenario, our test for the outcome model in-
dicates correctness. In general, however, the outcome test
may fail if the assignment model is misspecified because it
affects the inverse propensity weighting.
Finally, Figure 2b shows the outcome test when we impute
the missing data following Gelman et al. (2005). The bias
leads the test to pass (see Section 3), even though we use
the misspecified outcome model.
4.2 Observational study: Cockroaches
We analyze a real observational study of the effect of pest
management on cockroach levels in urban apartments (Gel-
man and Hill, 2006). Each apartment iwas set up with traps
for several days. The response is the number of cockroaches
trapped during that period; the treatment corresponds to
having applied the pesticide. We expect the pesticide to re-
duce the number of cockroaches.
Let ti be the number of trap days and yi the number of cock-
roaches for each apartment. We use two additional covari-
ates: the pre-treatment roach level ri and an indicator si of
whether the apartment is a “senior” building, restricted to
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(a) Results of the assignment test. Model (c), which has a wrong assignment mechanism, fails the test. The plots
for the fiction scenario (not shown) are similar to these ones, as the assignments are assumed independent of
the outcomes.
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(b) Results of the outcome test. The test fails for the model in which the outcome model is misspecified.
Figure 1: Results of the tests for the science-fiction scenario, in which we have access to both counterfactual outcomes.
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Figure 2: Results of the outcome tests for the fiction scenario, in which we only observe one counterfactual outcome.
(a) The outcome test fails for the model in which the outcome model is misspecified. (b) If we impute the missing data
following Gelman et al. (2005), the test does not fail, although we are using the wrong outcome model.
the elderly. We model the data as Poisson,
yi | ai, xi ∼ Poisson (yi |µi) ,
where µi = ti exp {θ0 + θ1si + θ2ri + θ3ai}, ai is the
treatment indicator, θ is the outcome model parameter,
and xi = {ti, si, ri}. We posit a logistic assignment
model,
ai |xi ∼ Bernoulli
(
ai | logistic([1, si, ri]>φ)
)
.
We place standard normal priors over the parameters and
draw 1000 posterior samples.
We first evaluate the assignment model with the average
log-likelihood of the assignments. Figure 3a illustrates the
test. The realized discrepancy is plausible.
Next we evaluate the outcome model, again with the mean
squared error of the ate. Figure 3b (left) illustrates the out-
come test for the Poisson model. The test fails: the model
lacks the overdispersion needed to capture the high variance
of the data (Gelman and Hill, 2006). This is typical with the
Poisson because its variance is equal to its mean.
We propose two alternative models. Model (b) replaces the
Poisson likelihood with a negative binomial distribution. It
has the same mean µi as the Poisson but its variance in-
creases quadratically. The variance is µi + µ2i /θ4, where
θ4 is a dispersion parameter. We place a gamma prior with
unit shape and rate over θ4. Model (c) has similar consid-
erations, but the variance is now a linear function of the
mean θ4µi.2 Figure 3b (center and right) illustrates the
causal tests for models (b) and (c). These results suggest
that model (c) is the most plausible.
4.3 Randomized experiment: The Electric Company
television show
We now consider an educational experiment performed
around 1970 on a set of elementary school classes. The
treatment in this experiment was exposure to a new educa-
tional television show called The Electric Company. In each
of four grades, the classes were completely randomized into
treated and control groups. At the end of the school year,
students in all the classes were given a reading test, and the
average test score within each class was recorded. The data
are at the classroom level.
Two classes from each grade were selected from each
school. Let yi1 and yi2 be the scores of each class for the
treatment and control groups, respectively. Let pi1 and pi2
be their pre-treatment scores at the beginning of the year.
We also introduce the notation g(i) to denote the grade
(from 1 to 4) of the two classes from the i-th pair. We first
2This can be achieved with a quasi-Poisson regression (Gel-
man and Hill, 2006), but this is not a proper probabilistic model.
Rather, we use a heteroscedastic Gaussian distribution with the
same mean and variance.
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Figure 3: Results for the cockroaches infestation study. The assignment test does not suggest any assignment model flaw.
The outcome tests suggest that the variance is a linear function of the mean.
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Figure 4: Results of the outcome test for the television show study. The models with a single weight for all grades (b) or a
single intercept for all pairs (c) are too simple and fail the test.
use a regression model of the form
yi1 ∼ N (yi1 | bi +mg(i)pi1 + θg(i), σ2g(i)),
yi2 ∼ N (yi2 | bi +mg(i)pi2, σ2g(i)),
where the model parameters are: bi, the intercept term that
depends on the specific pair i; m1:4, the weight of pi1 for
each grade; θ1:4, the treatment effect; and σ21:4, the variance
for each grade. We place a Gaussian prior over the inter-
cepts bi ∼ N (µg(i), τ2g(i)). We also place Gaussian priors
with zero mean and variance 104 over µg , θg , andmg . We
place gamma priors with shape 10 and rate 1 over σg and τg .
We refer to this model as model (a). We also test two simpli-
fied models. Model (b) assumes that the parameters θ and
m do not depend on the specific grade. Model (c) assumes
instead that the intercept b is shared for all pairs. Since we
know that this is a completely randomized experiment by
design, we do not posit any assignment model.
We plot in Figure 4 the results of the outcome test, which
is based on the mean squared error of the average treatment
effect. Model (a), which is the most flexible, seems to pro-
vide a sensible fit of the data. However, models (b) and
(c) are too simplistic. They clearly fail the test. If we had
started from any of these models in our analysis, the test
would suggest the need to revise them.
5 Discussion
We have developed model criticism for Bayesian causal in-
ference. This provides a rigorous foundation for diagnosing
if a given probabilistic model is appropriate.
Here, we assume the typical setup in Bayesian causal infer-
ence in which the posterior factorizes across outcome and
assignment parameters. However, this can lead to poor fre-
quentist properties (Robins and Ritov, 1997; Robins, 2004).
To accommodate this, Bayesian-frequentist compromises
have been proposed which force dependency between the
outcome and assignment models (Hoshino, 2008; McCan-
dless et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2016). In future work,
we will study causal discrepancies which are of the general
form of Eq.5, i.e., which depend simultaneously on assign-
ments and potential outcomes. Such discrepancies could
also be applied to check causal models with a non-ignorable
assignment mechanism.
Finally, there has been a surge of interest in model-based
causal inference for high-dimensional, massive, and het-
erogenous data. In such settings, one can capture more fine-
grained phenomena, whether it be with hierarchical mod-
els (Hirano et al., 2000; Feller and Gelman, 2014), regular-
ized regressions (Maathuis et al., 2009; Belloni et al., 2014),
structural equation models (Bottou et al., 2013; Peters et al.,
2015), or neural networks (Johansson et al., 2016). This is
an important regime for checking causal models.
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A Notation
We provide a table describing the notation we use in this
paper. See Table 1; Table 2; Table 3.
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Symbol Description
Ai Treatment assignment of individual i (random variable)
Yi(0), Yi(1) Potential outcomes of individual i (random variable)
A = (A1, . . . , An)
> Set of treatment assignments (random variable)
Y(0),Y(1) Set of potential outcomes (random variable)
= (Y1(0), . . . , Yn(0))
>, (Y1(1), . . . , Yn(1))>
ai Treatment assignment of individual i
yi(ai) Outcome of individual i when assigned to treatment ai
xi Observed covariates of individual i
a Set of treatment assignments
y(0),y(1) Set of potential outcomes
y(a) = (y1(a1), . . . , yn(an))
> Set of outcomes when assigned to set of treatments
x Set of observed covariates
Dobs = {ai, yi(ai)} Observed data set
Ddo = {adoi , yi(adoi )} Hypothetical data set from an intervention
Table 1: Notation for observational data.
Symbol Description
φ Parameters of the assignment model
p(ai |xi,φ) Assignment likelihood for individual i
p(a |x,φ) = ∏ni=1 p(ai |xi,φ) Assignment likelihood
p(a |x,φ)p(φ) Assignment model
θ Parameters of the outcome model
p(yi(0), yi(1) |xi,θ) Outcome likelihood for individual i
p(y(0),y(1) |x,θ) = ∏ni=1 p(yi(0), yi(1) |xi,θ) Outcome likelihood
p(y(0),y(1) |x,θ)p(θ) Outcome model
p(y(0),y(1) |x,θ)p(θ)p(a |x,φ)p(φ) Causal model
p(arep |x,φ)p(φ |a) Assignment model (a posteriori)
p(y(0)rep,y(1)rep |x,θ)p(θ |y) Outcome model (a posteriori)
p(y(0)rep,y(1)rep |x,θ)p(θ |y)p(arep |x,φ)p(φ |a) Causal model (a posteriori)
Table 2: Notation for causal models.
Symbol Description
(y(0)rep,y(1)rep),arep Replicated data set of outcomes and assignments
T ((y(0),y(1)),a,θ,φ) Causal discrepancy (over realizations)
T rep,s = T ((y(0)rep,s,y(1)rep,s),arep,θs,φs) Discrepancy over replication s
T obs,s = T ((y(0),y(1)),a,θs,φs) Realized discrepancy over replication s
p(T ) = {T rep,s} Reference distribution
T obs = {T obs,s} Realized discrepancy
Table 3: Notation for model criticism.
